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IMPLIED 'WARRANTIES IN THE SALE OF FOOD
Prior to the recent case of Swift & Co v. Wells,' Virginia based
the liability of a manufacturer to a consumer for latent defects in food
in sealed containers solely on negligence. 2 The issue of whether there
was an implied warranty of wholesomeness had never been litigated.3
In Swift the plaintiff's husband, acting as agent for plaintiff, bought
from a retail dealer a pork shoulder wrapped in cellophane and
labelled "Swift's Premium Picnic Shoulder." Because of a deleterious
substance4 in the shoulder at the time of packing, the plaintiff was
made ill. She based her action against the manufacturer upon a breach
of implied warranty rather than negligence, and the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the manufacturer of food does impliedly
warrant his product to the consumer-purchaser, regardless of the lack
of privity.5 The court, following a recent Texas case 6 which predi-
-2o Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
2Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Krausse, 162 Va. 107, 173 S.E. 497 (1934).
'1o S.E.2d at 2o7.
'Had the deleterious substance been something which could have been discovered
by examination of the cellophane wrapped package, this would not have been a
true sealed package case. But because the plaintiff's illness was caused by bacteria
not visible to the human eye, detection by examination was impossible, and the
sealed package doctrine was applicable. n1o S.E.2d at 204.
'Most of the more recent cases in other states have reached a similar result.
Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Ezzell, 22 Ala. App. 210, 114 So. 278 (1927);
Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954); Patargias v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947); Nichols v. Nold,
174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
221 La. 919, 6o So. 2d 873 (1952); Biederharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721,
186 So. 628 (1939); Brussels v. Grand Union Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 751, 187 At. 582
(1936); Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Asbury, 206 Okla. 269, 242 P.2d 417 (1952);
Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 6o9, 164 S.V.2d 828 (1942). The same
result is reached in at least one other jurisdiction on the theory that the manufac-
turer's warranty runs with the item sold, as covenants run with the land. Anderson
v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937). But a few courts adhere to the rule that
the consumer, lacking privity, cannot sue the manufacturer on an implied warranty.
Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1930); Pelletier v. DuPont,
124 Me. 269, 128 At. 186 (1925); Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 2o8 N.C. 1, v7g
S.E. 30 (1935); Cohan v. Associted Fur Farms, Inc., 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952).
The consumer may, of course, sue the manufacturer for negligence and may in
some instances have the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied in his favor. Atlanta
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 41 Ga. App. 705, 154 S.E. 385 (1930); Annot., 52
A.L.R.2d 117 and 159 (1957).
6Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 6o9, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
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cated the result on public policy, reasoned that "this permits the plac-
ing of the loss occasioned upon the manufacturer who is in the best
position to prevent the production and sale of unwholesome food."
7
The Swift decision is important because it gives the plaintiff a
more effective remedy against the manufacturer. But it is also im-
portant because of the effect it may have on related problems involving
implied warranties: (1) whether or not the retailer is liable to the
consumer-purchaser for defective food sold in sealed containers; and
(2) whether or not the retailer or manufacturer is liable to a consumer
who is someone other than the purchaser of the food.
In states which have not passed the Uniform Sales Act,8 a minority
of the courts which have considered the first problem above have held
the retailer liable on the theory of implied warranty.9 In these juris-
dictions reliance is placed upon the policy argument that the public
health is protected by holding the retailer liable, and language like the
following is not uncommon: "[W]e are confronted with the argument
that... [a] choice must be made between facilitation of commerce and
the preservation of public health. In such a choice it seems to us there
is no question that the latter should prevail."' 0 Although the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has never been confronted with this ques-
tion, there is dictum which indicates a similar approach to the prob-
lem.11 This reasoning is supported by logic if the consumer has no
direct warranty action against the manufacturer, but it is questionable
when the consumer does have such a remedy. For if the consumer may
sue the manufacturer on implied warranty, this deterrent protects
the public health, and commerce is promoted by eliminating the inno-
cent retailer. Nevertheless, courts which permit a direct warranty ac-
tion against the manufacturer have also held a retailer liable on im-
7 1o S.E.2d at 209.
8 The handling of the first problem under the Sales Act is discussed later in
this comment. See text accompanying notes 23-29 infra.
OSencer v. Carl's Mkts., Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 195o).
1 0Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1939).
u"[G]enerally the vendor has opportunities for information as to the wholesome-
ness of his foodstuff which the vendee cannot have. In business for profit he must
bear this burden which the law puts upon him." Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., I66
Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94, 97 (1936). The case involved impure milk which was apparently
packed by the retailer, and the language is therefore dictum when applied to a case
in which a retailer purchased from a manufacturer. In the sale of goods other
than food, the retailer is not liable for latent defects if he is not the manufacturer
and if the buyer knows that. Belcher v. Goff Bros., 145 Va. 488, 134 S.B. 588 (1926).
It therefore appears that, despite the Colonna case, the question is still open
in Virginia as to retail liability in the case of food sold in sealed packages.
VIRGINIA COMMENTS
plied warranty, although not without some controversy. 12 A principal
effect of this holding is to permit the consumer the convenience of
suing the local retailer rather than the less accessible manufacturer,
but public policy should not be predicated upon the convenience of
one party at the expense and inconvenience of another party who is
without fault.
13
Of course, in some cases of this nature it is virtually impossible for
the plaintiff to sue the manufacturer in the state of plaintiff's residence.
In such a case, because the manufacturer is located in a distant state
and is not "doing business"' 4 in the plaintiff's home state, the expense
and inconvenience may effectively eliminate the plaintiff's remedy. 15
Policy considerations in this situation would indicate that a recovery
may be had against the retailer, with the retailer bearing the subse-
quent expense and inconvenience of suing the manufacturer. The fact
that several recent cases have so held is an indication that this con-
sideration may be controlling in some instances.' 6
The majority rule on the first problem is that, in the absence of
statute, the retailer does not impliedly warrant to the consumer the
contents of a sealed package of food.' 7 Courts following this rule hold
"Florida: Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (manufacturer
liable); Sencer v. Carl's Mkts., Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1956) (retailer liable; three
judges concurring, two concurring specially, and two dissenting). Texas: Jacob E.
Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 6og, L64 S.W.2d 828 (1942) (manufacturer liable);
Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 138 Tex. 623, 164 S.A.2d 835, 142 A.L.R. 1424 (1942)
(retailer liable, one judge dissenting).
IVaite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 494,
514 (1936).
"'If the manufacturer is a corporation doing business in the plaintiff's home
state, statutes generally permit service of process on the foreign corporation. See
Va. Code Ann. §§ 13.1-111 and 13.1-119 (195o). Many manufacturers whose food pro-
ducts are sold within the state are transacting business as defined in such a statute and
are amenable to service of process. But when a manufacturer sells goods to a large re-
tail corporation, and that corporation ships the goods from its central depot to
its stores in several states, the manufacturer is not transacting business in those
states. 23 Am. Jur. Foreign Corporations § 371 (1939). Cf. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v.
Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 259 F.2d 502 (4 th Cir. 1956). Therefore the consumer would
not be able to sue the manufacturer locally, and his remedy against the manufacturer
may have become ineffective. For a detailed examination of what constitutes "doing
business," see Caplin, Doing Business in Other States (1959).
IzThe injured consumer may have another remedy if the jurisdiction allows
third party practice. In Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951), the
plaintiff was unable to have process served on the manufacturer. He sued the re-
tailer, and the retailer impleaded the wholesaler who had sold him the goods. The
wholesaler was held primarily liable to the consumer.
1 Annot., 142 A.L.R. 1434, 1435 (1943)-
1'Bigelow v. Maine Cent. R.R., x1o Me. lo5, 85 Atl. 396 (1912) (dining car case,
railroad treated as a retailer); Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145
1966]
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that a retailer only warrants that he has purchased from a reliable
manufacturer and that there is no apparent defect in the food.I s In
Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co.,' 9 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals said that the buyer "might reasonably expect the seller's
experience and judgment to protect him against goods of low grade or
dishonest manufacture or preparation, and that he would exercise rea-
sonable prudence and care in selecting the brand of the manufactured
or prepared food that he would sell in sealed packages. Beyond this,
we cannot see where the buyer would be relying upon the seller in the
purchase of goods contained in sealed packages." 20 Similarly, the Su-.
preme Court of Maine, noting that there is no opportunity for in-
spection of goods in sealed packages, adopted the rule that the seller
is not liable for defects in these goods.2' If the purchaser has a war-
ranty action against the manufacturer, the rule established in these
cases is sound-the purchaser has not been left without a remedy; the
innocent retailer is protected; and public health and economy are
promoted.
Withi the passage of the Uniform Sales Act, an anomalous result
may occur. Since the majority rule at common law releases the retail-
er 22 and since the Sales Act is a codification of the common law,
23
one would expect the result under the Sales Act to be basically the
same as that at common law. This has not been the case, however,
since practically all the courts that have considered the question have
held that the retailer is liable under the Sales Act on a theory of
implied warranty.24 In some states in which no implied warranty ex-
So. 726 (1933); Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App. Div. 278, 38 N.Y.S.2d
788 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W.Va. 68o, 186 S.E.
61o (1936); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 1434 (1943); Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1269 (1934).
18Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933).
91 7 W. Va. 68o, 186 S.E. 6io (1936).
2DId. at 684, 186 S.E. at 611. In West Virginia the retailer is liable for defects in
unsealed packages of food. Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Mkt., 121 W. Va. 6o5, 5 S.E.2d
785 (1939). An illustration of how the cases may be confused is seen in Kyle.v. Swift
& Co., 229 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1956). That case involved a hidden defect in a sealed
package of wieners-a clear case for application of the sealed package doctrine-
but the court, applying West Virginia law, followed the Burgess case, supra, and
held the retailer liable.
2Bigelow v. Maine Cent. R.R., 11o Me. 1o5, 85 Atl. 396 (1912).
2-See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
n"The drafters of the Sales Act undoubtedly intended to codify the general rules
applicable to contracts of sales . Funt v. Schiffman, 115 Misc. 155, 187 N.Y.S.
666, 667 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
ABurkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 AtI. 385 (1932); Martin v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 301 Ky. 429, 192 S.W.2d 201 (1946); Ward v. Great Atlan-
tic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 9o, 12o N.E. 225 (1918).
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isted prior to the Sales Act, such a warranty has been established
under the Act.2-5 Usually, the implied warranty of wholesomeness
is said to exist under Section 150) of the Uniform Sales Act, which
provides that the seller must know the particular purpose for which
the goods are bought and the buyer must rely on the skill and judg-
ment of the seller. It is held that the mere purchase of food acquaints
the seller with the particular purpose for which it is bought. 26 More-
over, it is also held that the sale itself is proof that the buyer relied
on the skill and judgment of the seller 7 If the seller had some op-
portunity for superior knowledge as to tile contents of the package,
the inference of reliance by the purchaser would be reasonable. But
when the retailer and purchaser are on equal footing and, in fact, the
purchaser has the only opportunity for examination when he opens
the package, the reasoning is questionable.2 8 Notwithstanding the
above, the retailer's liability under the Uniform Sales Act is well
settled.
2 9
As to the second problem-manufacturer or retailer liability to a
plaintiff consumer who was not himself the purchaser of the food-
the cases are in hopeless conflict. Some courts have thoroughly ex-
amined the problem and permitted the nonpurchaser to sue, dispens-
ing with the requirement of privity.30 Other courts, after an equally
exhaustive survey, have retained privity as an absolute requirement
and have denied recovery.3 1 Still others have permitted the nonpur-
chaser to sue, without discussing privity.32 The present rule in Vir-
ginia is that the nonpurchasing consumer may not sue, for he is not a
party to the contract of sale.33
mJulian v. Laubenberger, i6 Misc. 646, 38 N.Y. Supp. 1052 (Sup. Ct. 1896)
(retailer not liable at common law); Lieberman v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker
Co., 117 Misc. 531, 191 N.Y. Supp. 593 (1921) (retailer liable under the New York law
corresponding to Section 15(1) of the Uniform Sales Act).
-See cases cited in note 24 supra.
-This proposition is also supported by the cases at note 24 supra. Perhaps even
stronger support is given by the statement made by the author of the Uniform
Sales Act that "the mere fact of purchase from a dealer for immediate domestic
consumption has rightly been regarded as sufficient evidence of such reliance [on
the skill and judgment of the seller] ... ." i Williston, Sales § 242, at 634 (3 d ed.1948).
1 Scruggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925).
1A search of cases decided under the Uniform Sales Act reveals only one lead-
ing case which held the retailer not liable. Wilkes v. Memphis Grocery Co., 23 Tenn.
App. 550, 134 S.W.2d 929 (1939). The Sales Act was not mentioned in the opinion.
n5See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
mSee, e.g., Cornelius v. B. Filippone & Co., 119 N.J.L. 540, 197 At. 647 (1938).
I-See, e.g., Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1o9 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939).
=Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936).
196o]
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If a purchaser has an implied warranty on the ground of public
policy, then other persons who may reasonably be expected to con-
sume the food should enjoy the same status. Accordingly, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court held that "the manufacturer impliedly warranted
the purity of the [sealed] drink to such of the public as became the
rightful possessor and owner of the Coca-Cola."3 4 Connecticut pro-
vides by statute that warranties of wholesomeness "extend to the pur-
chaser and to all persons for whom such food or drink is intended." 35
Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a guest or
any member of the household for which the food is purchased may
sue if he might reasonably have been expected to consume the food.36
These manifestations of judicial and legislative opinion show a strong
trend toward holding the manufacturer liable to any person who may
reasonably be expected to consume the food.
A third problem is that of the manufacturer's contractual dis-
claimer of warranty. Few, if any, cases have resolved this precise
point.37 The limited authority available indicates that the common
law governing other sales of personalty will apply, so that the parties
to the transaction may by contract eliminate all warranties, both ex-
press and implied.38 Courts showing grave concern for public health
in other food cases may be expected to view such disclaimers of war-
ranty as against public policy and therefore void. In the absence of
such clean-cut holdings, the manufacturer may attempt to relieve
himself of all liability, but courts have demonstrated a marked re-
luctance to waive the provisions of a warranty implied by law.39
There is one basic proposition which affects all the above prob-
lems: the consumer who is unable to protect himself adequately
against hidden defects in food must be afforded a remedy when he suf-
fers injury. The remedy should be against the one best able to remove
hidden defects, for in that manner the cause of harm will be more
readily eliminated. Therefore, a manufacturer should be held re-
sponsible for defects in his food products despite disclaimers of war-
ranty and the plaintiff's lack of privity. On the other hand, a retailer
mCoca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305, 307 (1927).
5Conn. Gen. Stat. Supp. § 2859 d (1955).
'*Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318.
a1A search of American cases back to 1916 reveals no cases precisely on point.
-In Garofalo Co. v. St. Mary's Packing Co., 339 Ill. App. 412, 9o N.E.2d 292 (1950),
the plaintiff retailer bought a lot of canned tomato juice from defendant. The
sale was "as is no recourse." The goods were seized by the health department for
impurities, and the plaintiff attempted to recover his loss from the seller. It was
held that the parties had negatived all warranties, express or implied.
"OSee Void, Sales § 150 (1931).
